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I. Letters of Intent and Other Precontractual Documents
The conclusion of international merger or acquisition agree-
ments is generally preceded by a relatively long negotiation phase.
During this phase the parties usually exchange a number of docu-
ments, which often are aimed at reflecting some preliminary agree-
ments or understandings of one or more parties to the future
contract, or having other purposes. These documents are precon-
tractual in light of the future contract to be stipulated by the parties,
but they often contain binding commitments directly or indirectly re-
lated to the subject matter of the merger or acquisition contract
under negotiation.
Although the development of international practice with respect
to precontractual documents has been impressive, the practice has
received only limited attention from legal scholars. This is because
legal scholars have traditionally looked at the simpler negotiation
* Professor, Faculty of Law, Catholic University of Milan, Italy; Senior Counsel, In-
ternational, General Electric Company (USA), London, England.
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phase of domestic contracts. In doing so they have concentrated on
the interrelationship between the offer and the acceptance within the
framework of contract formation rules. The only relatively complete
surveys of the international commercial practice regarding precon-
tractual documents address the most common category of such doc-
uments-the letter of intent. The critical issue with respect to such
documents is the difficulty of identifying cases in which letters of in-
tent have a binding nature or other legal effects.
Letters of intent, however, constitute only one type of precon-
tractual document. The parties generally exchange them when a
merger or acquisition negotiation has reached a certain stage of de-
velopment, and the parties wish to memorialize it before proceeding
further toward the possible conclusion of a final agreement.
Before signing a letter of intent, in fact even before actually
starting the negotiations, parties often request other types of precon-
tractual documents to govern certain aspects of their relationship
pending the negotiation process. The most important aspect is the
need to preserve the confidentiality of information regarding the
company to be acquired or the companies to be merged. Often-
times, such information is exchanged between the parties at the initi-
ation of negotiations, and is the basis for a decision as to whether or
not negotiations should continue. Consequently, detailed texts of
confidentiality agreements which specifically state the obligations of
the receiving party regarding sensitive information received from the
other party have been developed for international commercial
practice.
Because these confidentiality agreements are signed very early
in the negotiations, they frequently provide a convenient opportu-
nity to settle other concerns of the parties that are only indirectly
related to the confidentiality of the. information exchanged. For ex-
ample, recent texts of confidentiality agreements, exchanged during
the negotiation phase of merger or acquisition agreements, address
the seller's concern that the prospective buyer may indulge in "in-
sider trading" activities with respect to the shares, the sale of which
is being negotiated, or that the buyer might launch a hostile takeover
attempt with respect to the company whose sale or merger is under
negotiation. The parties often insert in the confidentiality agree-
ments so called "standstill" commitments, i.e., commitments not to
undertake parallel negotiations with third parties while negotiations
between the parties are in process. Finally, the parties sometimes
insert into their confidentiality agreements clauses preventing the
parties from making employment offers to the other party's key per-
sonnel during the negotiations and for a period of time thereafter.
The following sections will describe: (i) confidentiality agree-
ments in general; (ii) their provisions concerning protection against
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insider trading; (iii) their provisions concerning protection against
hostile takeovers; (iv) standstill agreements; and (v) prohibitions on
making employment offers to the other party's personnel.
II. Confidentiality Agreements in General
The nondisclosure obligation with respect to the confidential in-
formation exchanged during negotiations probably derives, even in
the absence of a confidentiality agreement, from the general obliga-
tion to negotiate in good faith.' However, the parties when negotiat-
ing a merger or acquisition contract do not normally rely on such
general good faith obligations, but prefer to express their respective
rights and obligations in detailed confidentiality agreements. Model
text of such an agreement, derived from international commercial
practice, is found in Appendix. 1. The key sentence of this text is:
All information disclosed or furnished by one party to the other,
whether orally or in writing, in connection with any discussions per-
taining to a potential joint venture or other business alliance be-
tween ABC and XYZ in the - business shall be deemed to be
proprietary and confidential information (Proprietary Information)
of the disclosing party. The receiving party agrees that for a period
of - years from the date of this Agreement, it shall not disclose any
Proprietary Information to any third party nor use any Proprietary
Information for any purpose other than to evaluate its interest in the
potential joint venture or other business alliance referred to above.
The receiving party shall protect all Proprietary Information with
the same degree of care as it applies to protect its own proprietary
and confidential information.
Note that the duration of the commitment by the receiving party
not to disclose the information received (left blank in the above re-
ported clause) generally varies from three to five years.
If the nondisclosure obligation is undertaken for an undeter-
mined period of time (which is not unusual), its actual duration, in
case of dispute, will be established by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion. The decision will depend on the applicable law. As a rule of
thumb, it is likely the owner of the information will be protected only
if it can show that it has a continuing interest in the confidential na-
ture of the information.
The party receiving the information promises not only to refrain
from disclosure, but also not to use it "for any purpose other than to
evaluate its interest in the potential joint venture or other business
alliance." This formula indicates the more stringent and explicit
I Fontaine, Les Lettres dintention dans la NAigociation des Contrats Internationaux, 3 DROIT
ET PRATIQUE DE COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 73, 96 (1977). On the obligation to conduct
negotiations in good faith, both in civil and common law, see Farnsworth, Precontractual
Liabilitv and Preliminay, greements: Fair Dealings and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUm. L. REV.
217 (1987).
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wording of the increasingly elaborated texts of confidentiality agree-
ments (which will be discussed further, below).
In addition to the obligations to abstain ("not to disclose" and
"not to use"), the receiving party also promises to act, i.e., to "pro-
tect all Proprietary Information with the same degree of care as it
applies to protect its own proprietary and confidential information."
This presents the obvious risk of relying on the assumption that the
receiving party has a high standard of care in protecting its own in-
formation, which may not actually be the case. Consequently, it
should be used with caution. It is better to clarify that the protection
afforded to the information's owner by the obligations to abstain
constitutes a minimum protection in any event. The obligation to act
would be operative only in the sense of offering greater protection
for cases where the information's recipient applies a higher standard
of care. The clause would then allow the party supplying the infor-
mation to benefit from this higher standard.
The second paragraph of Appendix 1 contains limitations or ex-
clusions on the nondisclosure obligation. Notwithstanding the boil-
erplate nature of such limitations or exclusions, they should always
be included in confidentiality agreements for clarity's sake and to
avoid endless disputes. Those appearing in Appendix 1 are particu-
larly elaborate. The first limitation or exclusion states that if the con-
fidential information comes to be within the public domain, then the
receiving party is no longer bound by the secrecy obligation. Never-
theless, this exclusion would not apply, according to the clause, if the
information comes to be within the public domain due to a violation
of the nondisclosure obligation by the receiving party (a clarification
which may appear unnecessary to a civil law lawyer).2 The other lim-
itations or exclusions mentioned by the second paragraph are self-
explanatory and do not require any particular comment.
A party bound by a confidentiality obligation may be required,
by order of a judge, to disclose the information received. Disclosure
which occurs in such a situation would not, of course, result in liabil-
ity for the disclosing party. Some confidentiality agreements con-
template that if a party receives this disclosure order, it should
immediately notify the owner of the information so that it may seek
an appropriate protective order.
The third paragraph of the confidentiality agreement in Appen-
dix 1 contains a termination provision. The provision does not affect
the duration of the nondisclosure obligation, which generally sur-
vives the termination of the contract.3 It may seem superfluous to
2 "Nemo de improbitate sua consequitur actionem." DIG. 47.2.12(1) (Ulpian, De
Furtis) (No one can derive an advantage from his own misbehavior.).
3 See Fontaine, Les Obligations "'Survivant au Contrat" dans les Contra/s Internationaux, 10
DROIT ET PRATIQUE DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 7, 17-18 (1984). Fontaine specifically
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provide for a termination of the confidentiality agreement itself, di-
vorced from the termination of the secrecy obligation. This clause,
however, contemplates the possibility that, at a given moment in
time, one or both parties may want the information to be returned
from thereceiving party to its owner, either because the negotiations
have broken off or because they have failed to produce any agree-
ment after a given period of time. Hence, the need for a termination
provision for -the confidentiality agreement itself, apart from the du-
ration of the secrecy obligation, is recognized.
Note that in the fifth paragraph of Appendix 1, the parties use
the confidentiality agreement as an opportunity to affirm their free-
dom to entertain parallel negotiations with third parties. The text
reads: "Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as precluding
the receiving party at any time from ... negotiating with, or entering
into any agreement with others relating to the general subject matter
of this Agreement."
Section V below discusses standstill agreements, which contain
diametrically opposed clauses. In connection with the clause above,
it is surprising that the freedom to entertain parallel negotiations is
established only in favor of the party receiving the information, not
in favor of the party supplying it.
Finally, the last paragraph of Appendix 1 clarifies that its clauses
prevail over any legend (such as "strictly confidential") the parties
supplying the information might stamp upon the relevant docu-
ments. It is preferable to detail into an agreement the rights and
obligations of the parties with respect to confidential information,
rather than leaving them to interpretation or legends of doubtful
meaning stamped on the documents containing such information.
The confidentiality agreements discussed in this section are
precontractual documents which, unlike most letters of intent, con-
tain binding obligations of a contractual nature. The violation of
such obligations constitutes a breach of contract entitling the dam-
aged party to full compensation for the damages suffered, not merely
for the "reliance damages," as would be the case under the culpa in
contrahendo principles for letters of intent. 4
Damages will be those reimbursable under the applicable law.
For the violation of secrecy obligations, however, it is not always easy
for the damaged party to provide evidence of the damages incurred.
Additionally, the damages actually incurred might be higher than
those which can be proven. To overcome this difficulty, the confi-
addresses the confidentiality obligation among those generally surviving the termination
of the contract, as well as the legal issues created by such obligations. See id. at 21-27.
4 On the consequences of violation of the secrecy obligation, see Fontaine, supra
note 1, at 96; Morin, Le Devoir de Coopiration dans les Contrats Internationaux, 6 DROIT ET
PRATIQUE DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 9, 11-12 (1980); Schmidt, La Nigociation du Contral
International, 9 DROIT ET PRATIQUE DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 239, 256-60 (1983).
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dentiality agreements sometimes provide: "The parties recognize
that the remedy at law for any breach by either of the parties of its
obligations hereunder is inadequate and either party shall be entitled
to equitable remedies, including injunction, in the event of breach by
the other party." However, the practical effect of the above clause is
limited since courts cannot apply any criteria in determining the
amounts of the damages other than that contemplated by the law.5
Only an arbitration board deciding on the basis of equity could enjoy
greater discretion in its appraisal of damages, but this would create
other problems which the parties may want to avoid. It is better to
use a penalty clause, with full knowledge of the limitations to which
penalty clauses are subject under many national laws. 6
III. Protection Against Insider Trading During the Negotiations
More sophisticated texts of confidentiality agreements (such as
those appearing in Appendices 2 and 3) supplied during the acquisi-
tion negotiations contain additional clauses specifically intended to
prohibit certain undesired use of the information regarding the com-
pany to be acquired. Sometimes these prohibitions are simply in-
tended to reinforce existing statutory provisions of the applicable
law; other times they impose new obligations upon the recipient of
such information.
The prohibition against using the confidential information ex-
cept in such a way as to evaluate whether to buy or sell on the stock
market shares of the company which is the subject of the negotia-
tions is an illustration of the first type. Examples of such provisions
are included in each of the two texts in Appendices 2 and 3. The
third paragraph of Appendix 2 reads:
You [the information's recipient] hereby acknowledge that you are
aware, and that you will advise such directors, officers, employees
and representatives who are informed as to the matters which are
5 For example, in France such damages are determined according to Code Civil arts.
1150 and 1151 and in Italy according to Codice Civile arts. 1223 and 1225. These provi-
sions contemplate that only damages that are the direct consequence of the breach and are
foreseeable at the moment the obligation was undertaken can be reimbursed. British law
adopts instead the criteria of "causation" and "remoteness." Though it would appear that
these criteria leave little room for equity considerations, in both civil and common law
systems there is great incertitude as to the criteria for reimbursement of damages so that
often the courts end up issuing decisions based to a considerable extent on common sense
and equity.
13 See the various exposes regarding the provisions of different national laws con-
cerning penalty clauses in Schneider, International Construction Contrats [sic], 8 DROIT ET
PRATIQUE DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 429, 443 (1982). See also Fontaine, Les Clauses
Pinales dans les Contrats Internationaux, 8 DROIT ET PRATIQUE DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL
401 (1982); Benjamin, Penalties, Liquidated Damages and Penal Clauses in Commercial Contracts:
A Comparative Study of English and Continental Law, 9 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 600 (1960); Segre,
Clause Penale et Dommage Ulterieure en Droit Compar, 22 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
COMPAR 229 (1970); Thilmany, Fonctions et Rdvisibilit'des Clauses Pnales en Droit Compar, 32
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARI 17 (1980).
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the subject of this letter, that the United States securities laws pro-
hibit any person who has received from an issuer material, nonpub-
lic information concerning the matters which are the subject of this
letter from purchasing or selling securities of such issuer or from
communicating such information to any other person under circum-
stances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such person is
likely to purchase or sell such securities.
Paragraph 5 of the text of Appendix 3 goes even further, impos-
ing upon the recipient of the information a contractual obligation
which strengthens the prohibition derived by the law:
The Company [receiving the information] acknowledges that it is
aware (and that its representatives who are appraised of this matter
have been, or upon becoming so appraised will be, advised) of the
restrictions imposed by the United States federal securities laws and
other applicable laws on a person possessing material nonpublic in-
formation about a company. The Company hereby agrees that while
it is in possession of the Information and, for a period of five years
thereafter, neither it nor any of its representatives or affiliates will
directly or indirectly propose to ABC on behalf of itself or any third
party, or in any manner participate itself or with a third party, or
assist any third party, in a purchase or an offer or an agreement to
purchase any securities or assets of ABC or any subsidiary or other
affiliate of ABC.
The first of the illustrations above merely recalls the applicable
U.S. laws on insider trading, which are actually included in the In-
sider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 as amended by The Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, passed by
the U.S. Congress. 7 The second illustration, after having recalled
the applicability of the above statutes, translates some of their provi-
sions into contractual obligations, though with certain important dif-
ferences. The contractual obligation is narrower than the statutory
one, to the extent that it concerns only the purchase, not the sale, of
shares of the company to be acquired, and has a time limitation of
five years. On the other hand, it does not contain reference to "ma-
terial" information, as the U.S. insider trading regulations do, but
applies in all cases in which confidential information of any kind is
supplied by one of the parties to the other. Even where the text of
the agreement merely refers to the applicable regulations, such ref-
erence is not useless because it draws the recipient party's attention
to the need to comply with such regulations in the course of the ne-
gotiations between the two parties.
Many large international companies send circular letters to all
their employees who are, or could be, aware of the pending negotia-
tions in order to protect themselves against inadvertent violations of
similar provisions contained in confidentiality agreements signed by
their employees. Such letters are drafted substantially as follows:
7 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
702, 102 Stat. 4677.
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As you know we are considering a potential transaction involv-
ing ABC, a publicly-traded company, and have signed with ABC a
confidential agreement containing the following clauses. . . . You
should consider the fact that such a transaction can be "inside infor-
mation," i.e., information that could affect the price of ABC stock
when and if the information is publicly disclosed. In view of this,
you should not, until after either a public announcement relating to
this matter or the termination of our consideration of a possible
transaction: trade in ABC stock; suggest that anyone else trade in
ABC stock; disclose the fact that we are considering this transaction
to anyone who does not have a need to know (you should also pro-
vide a copy of this letter to anyone to whom you disclose this
information).
By doing this, the company separates its liability from that of its
employees, who may violate the insider trading regulations or the
contractual commitments undertaken by the company. It also estab-
lishes a basis for disciplinary action against such employees, as well
as for recovering the damages from them. The general applicability
of these provisions is affected by their reference to the specific U.S.
insider trading regulations. Considering the increasing attention
that the EEC 8 and many EEC member states are giving to the
problems of insider trading, it is easy to predict that this practice will
spread (if it is not already spreading) around Europe.
IV. Protection Against Hostile Takeovers During the Negotiations
In some cases, the texts of confidentiality agreements impose
upon the recipient of the information certain obligations which are
not related to a specific body of legislation such as the insider trading
regulations. Clauses preventing the recipient of the information
from launching hostile takeover bids that target the company whose
acquisition is under negotiation are examples.
Takeovers are "hostile" to the extent that the bidder is acting
without the target management's agreement. The use of hostile
takeovers is common in the United States, and is rapidly spreading
into Europe, as indicated by recent widely-publicized cases in Eng-
land, France, and Belgium.
When management of a company negotiates, for example, the
sale of a company's business activity to a third party, and corre-
spondingly supplies certain financial and technical information to a
third party, the company would want to protect itself from the risk
that the potential "friendly" acquirer might use the information to
establish a price for a hostile takeover bid with this company as its
target. This risk is far from theoretical.
The fifth paragraph of Appendix 2 reads (with emphasis added):
8 A proposed EEC directive prohibiting insider trading was adopted on April 29,
1987 (30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 153) 8 (1987)) and later amended on October 27, 1988
(31 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 277) 13 (1988)).
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You hereby acknowledge, that the Evaluation Material is being fur-
nished to you in consideration of your agreement that you will not
propose to the Company or any other person any transaction be-
tween you and the Company and/or its security holders or involving
any of its security holders unless the Company shall have requested
in writing that you make such a proposal, and that You will not acquire,
or assist, advise or encourage any other persons in acquiring, directly or indi-
rectly, control of the Company or any of the Company's securities, businesses or
assets for a period of three years from the date of this letter unless the Company
shall have consented in advance in writing to such acquisition. You also
agree that the Company shall be entitled to equitable relief, includ-
ing injunction, in the event of any breach of the provisions of this
paragraph and that you shall not oppose the granting of such relief.
Paragraph 5 of Appendix 3 deals with the issue of hostile take-
overs in the following way (with emphasis added):
The Company hereby agrees that while it is in possession of the In-
formation and, for a period of five years thereafter, neither it nor any
of its representatives or affiliates will directly or indirectly propose
to ABC on behalf of itself or any third party, or in any manner par-
ticipate itself or with a third party, or assist any third party, in an offer
or an agreement to enter into any acquisition, merger or other business combina-
tion transaction relating to ABC or any subsidiary or other affiliates of ABC
* . . unless any such offer or proposal shall have been specifically invited by the
Chief Executive Officer or the Board of Directors of ABC or unless any such
proposal shall relate to an immaterial amount of assets or insignifi-
cant subsidiary or affiliate of ABC and with respect to which a repre-
sentative of ABC has invited a proposal by the Company.
In spite of the different wording and duration -(three years ver-
sus five years) of these obligations, the purpose of both clauses is to
prevent the information's recipient from attempting to acquire the
company to which the information refers, without the agreement of
that company's management.
It is clear that, in case of breach of the obligations contemplated
in the clauses reported above, the only effective relief for the dam-
aged party consists of obtaining an injunction preventing the hostile
takeover. Should the takeover be allowed, the mere reimbursement
of damages would not be an adequate remedy, particularly consider-
ing the fact that, following the hostile takeover, the damaging entity
would end up controlling the damaged entity. Consequently, the
first clause makes express reference to an injunctive remedy for
breaches of the obligation not to attempt hostile takeovers.
From a broader perspective, clauses of this kind can be included
in so-called "poison pills," i.e., devices (generally of a corporate law
nature) by which management attempts to protect itself against hos-
tile takeovers by third parties. "Poison pills" include disposition of
the strategic business of the company (making it less attractive to a
hostile bidder) and capital increases which dilute share ownership by
the third party.
Note that the obligations mentioned in this section generally
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survive the termination of the contract, giving rise to the same kind
of problems discussed in Section II above with respect to confidenti-
ality obligations.9
V. Standstill Agreements
Another recurring concern for the parties to a negotiation is that
one of them might secretly entertain parallel negotiations with third
parties. The existence of such parallel negotiations could adversely
affect the bargaining position of one of the parties. The negotiating
strategy for a buyer would be different if it knew that it was really
involved in an auction. Potential buyers might not be interested in
negotiating in an auction environment.
From a business ethics perspective, no one should falsely lead
his negotiating partner to believe that he has a genuine intention to
enter into a contract when', for instance, he intends only to push the
negotiations up to a particular reference price in order to trigger a
first refusal clause involving a third party. Equally condemnable
from a business ethics point of view is continuing to negotiate with-
out intending to contract and with the sole purpose of creating the
threat of an alternative in the eyes of a third party with whom parallel
negotiations are in process.
From a strictly legal perspective, it is generally admissible to en-
tertain parallel negotiations without informing the various partners,
with the only limitations being those deriving from considerations of
culpa in contrahendo in civil law countries.' 0 However it is not easy,
from a practical point of view, to determine when the good faith
threshhold has been passed; hence, parties frequently use standstill
agreements (such as the one in Appendix 4) under which one of the
negotiating parties undertakes the obligation, for a limited time
(normally not exceeding two or three months), not to conduct paral-
lel negotiations with third parties.
The text reproduced in Appendix 4 is a letter agreement be-
tween ABC and XYZ. ABC, a company of relatively small dimension,
was exploiting advanced technology. XYZ, a large multinational
company, was selling products that would benefit from this technol-
ogy. XYZ was interested in buying all or part of ABC's business ac-
tivities where this technology was being used. ABC, when signing
the usual confidentiality agreement, and "in order to continue the
negotiation," asked XYZ to commit itself to a "standstill agree-
ment." (Actually the confidentiality clause is not very elaborate and
9 See Fontaine. supra note 3, at 21-27.
1o See Schmidt, supra note 4, at 259 (in the absence of agreement, concurrent negotia-
tions do not constitute afaule ddlirtuelle). This statement can be substantially shored, ex-
cept for the case where the nondisclosure of a parallel negotiation can be said to violate
the obligation to conduct negotiations in good faith. See generally Farnsworth, supra note I
(regarding parallel negotiations as instances of unfair dealing).
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is confined to point 5 of Appendix 4.) By far the most detailed provi-
sion of the agreement is that concerning XYZ's commitments not to
enter into negotiations with third parties regarding the possible
purchase of competing business activities-not to dispose of XYZ's
business activities concerning the products affected by the proposed
agreement with ABC, and not to conclude any agreement with third
parties concerning such products over and above the ordinary
course of business.
In spite of their limited duration (two months) and the rather
routine exceptions contemplated by point 3 of the agreement, these
commitments are significantly onerous for XYZ; they find their justi-
fication in ABC's need to be protected from possible bad faith behav-
ior by XYZ, and to be reassured about XYZ's seriousness in
negotiating with ABC.
The enforceability of obligations not to entertain parallel nego-
tiations varies from country to country. Enforceability is generally
conceded,' but there is difficulty in determining the amount of the
reimbursable damages in case of breach. The enclosed text provides
a solution to this problem in point 4 which begins by stating that the
breach by XYZ of its "standstill" commitment would cause irrepara-
ble damages to ABC and that such damages would in any case be
very difficult to quantify. The clause further prescribes that in the
event of a breach, XYZ would pay ABC two million U.S. dollars, in
addition to reimbursing ABC for its out-of-pocket expenses.
The clause also specifies that the two million U.S. dollar pay-
ment constitutes "liquidated damages," not "penalties." By calling
it "liquidated damages," the parties intended to circumvent the gen-
eral hostility shown by national laws to "penalties," i.e., provisions
not intended to provide a genuine estimate of damages, but contem-
plating payments in amounts unrelated to the actual damages in-
curred in order to function as a deterrent against breaches of
contractual obligations. 12 What is permitted is a provision for "liqui-
dated damages," which constitute an estimate of damages, made by
the parties in case of a future breach of an obligation, when the
amount of such damages cannot be easily determined.
In the Appendix 4 example, it is doubtful that the mere qualifi-
cation of this payment by the parties as "liquidated damages" would
prevent a court from deeming it a "penalty" considering that there is
no reasonable relation between the actual damages incurred as a
consequence of the parallel negotiations and the amount of two mil-
lion U.S. dollars. A common law court would consider the clause
invalid and a civil law judge would not feel inhibited, even in the
I I See Schmidt, supra note 4, at 258-59 (referring to the enforceability of obligations
not to entertain parallel negotiations under English and French law).
12 See supra note 6.
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presence of this qualification, from reducing the amount of the pen-
alty at his own discretion if the law so authorizes. 13
VI. Protection Against Employment Offers Made During the
Negotiations
Oftentimes, parties negotiating a merger or acquisition protect
themselves against attempts by one party to hire key personnel of the
other party during the negotiations in their confidentiality agree-
ments. Actions of this type are connected, though indirectly, with
the exchange of information, or at least with the obligation of the
receiving party not to use such information in any way detrimental to
the party supplying it.
Negotiations create excellent opportunities to meet and evaluate
key personnel of the other party. For some companies, people are
their most important asset. Examples include engineering, software,
and project management companies, whose value is really a function
of the professionalism and competence of their leaders and key em-
ployees. Therefore, it is understandable that the potential buyer of
such companies may try to identify these key people by taking advan-
tage of the contacts developed during the negotiations, and then
make an employment offer to these people at particularly advanta-
geous conditions. Should this action be successful, the potential
buyer will reach substantially the same objective he would have
achieved by purchasing the company, but at a much lower cost.
The potential seller of a company or business activity often tries
to protect himself against such a risk by obliging the other party (al-
ready beginning negotiations) to abstain from making employment
offers to key personnel. A clause frequently used to achieve this ob-
jective is: "Without ABC's prior written consent, you will not, for a
period of two years from the date hereof, directly or indirectly solicit
for employment or employ any person who is now employed by the
Business Unit in an executive or technical position or otherwise con-
sidered a key employee."
The practical effect of such a clause must not be overrated. A
party willing to circumvent it would simply refrain from making for-
mal employment offers, and would instead informally approach the
other party's employees, making sure that the employees take the
initiative, i.e., that they request to be hired. No contractual clause
could prevent someone from being hired who is already in the em-
ployment market. Obviously the real issue is the ability of the dam-
aged party to prove the violation of the non-hiring obligation. This
problem is the same as that of repetitive hiring of a competitor's em-
ployees under unfair competition laws of many nations.
13 For example, the French Civil Code and the Italian Civil Code give a judge such
power. CODE Civi. arts. 1152(2), 1231 (Fr.); CODICE CIVILE arts. 1384, 1526 (Italy).
[VOL. 16
1991] PRECONTRACTUAL MERGER DOCUMENTS 57
In order for the non-hiring obligation to have some effect, its
duration must exceed that of the negotiations themselves, so as not
to create the incentive to break-off negotiations by the party wishing
to freely hire the other's personnel. This is why these obligations
generally survive both the negotiations and the termination of the
confidentiality agreements in which they are inserted.
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Appendix 1
Gentlemen:
Representatives of ABC and XYZ have agreed to preliminarily
discuss the potential for a joint venture or other business alliance
between ABC and XYZ in the - business. ABC and XYZ each
agrees that during these discussions there will be a need to exchange
oral and written information which is considered to be proprietary to
it and confidential, and each is willing to disclose such information
under the terms and conditions set forth below:
1. All information disclosed or furnished by one party to the
other, whether orally or in writing, in connection with any discus-
sions pertaining to a potential joint venture or other business alli-
ance between ABC and XYZ in the - business shall be deemed to be
proprietary and confidential information (Proprietary Information)
of the disclosing party. The receiving party agrees that for a period
of - years from the date of this Agreement, it shall not disclose any
Proprietary Information to any third party nor use any Proprietary
Information for any purpose other than to evaluate its interest in the
potential joint venture or other business alliance referred to above.
The receiving party shall protect all Proprietary Information with the
same degree of care as it applies to protect its own proprietary and
confidential information.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 1 above, the
receiving party shall have no obligation with respect to any informa-
tion which (i) is or becomes within the public domain through no act
of the receiving party in breach of this Agreement; (ii) was in the
possession of the receiving party prior to its disclosure or transfer
hereunder and the receiving party can so prove; (iii) is independently
developed by the receiving party and the receiving party can so
prove; or (iv) is received from another source without any restriction
on use or disclosure.
3. Except for the obligations of the parties with respect to Pro-
prietary Information disclosed prior to expiration or termination,
this Agreement shall (unless extended by mutual agreement) expire
or terminate at the earliest of the following events:
(a) one (1) year after the date of this Agreement; or
(b) thirty (30) days after written notice of termination provided
by either party to the other.
Upon such expiration or termination, either party may request
from the other party that all documentation (and copies thereof)
containing Proprietary Information be returned, and the other party
shall so return such documentation forthwith.
4. No rights to any patents or trademarks are provided or are
to be implied by any provision of this Agreement or any Proprietary
Information exchanged pursuant to this Agreement.
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5. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as precluding
the receiving party at any time from independently developing ideas,
negotiating with, or entering into any agreement with others relating
to the general subject matter of this Agreement, subject, however, to
the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof with respect to disclo-
sure and use of Proprietary Information.
6. This Agreement contains the sole and entire agreement be-
tween the parties relating to the subject hereof and any representa-
tion, promise, or condition not contained herein, or any amendment
hereto shall not be binding on either party unless set forth in a sub-
sequent written agreement signed by an authorized representative of
the party to be bound thereby.
If the foregoing provisions are acceptable to you, please signify
your acceptance by signing and returning the enclosed duplicate
copy of this letter. This Agreement shall apply in lieu of and
notwithstanding any specific legend or statement associated with any
particular document or information exchanged.
Very truly yours,
ABC
ACCEPTED AND AGREED BY:
XYZ
1991]




In connection with your consideration of a possible transaction
with ABC (the "Company"), you have requested information con-
cerning the Company. As a condition to your being furnished such
information, you agree to treat any information concerning the Com-
pany (whether prepared by the Company, its advisors or otherwise)
which is furnished to you by or on behalf of the Company (herein
collectively referred to as the "Evaluation Material") in accordance
with the provisions of this letter and to take or abstain from taking
certain other actions herein set forth. The term "Evaluation Mate-
rial" does not include information which (i) is already in your posses-
sion, provided that such information is not known by you to be
subject to another confidentiality agreement with or other obligation
of secrecy to the Company or another party, or (ii) becomes gener-
ally available to the public other than as a result of a disclosure by
you or your directors, officers, employees, agents or advisors, or (iii)
becomes available to you on a non-confidential basis from a source
other than the Company or its advisors, provided that such source is
not known by you to be bound to a confidentiality agreement with or
other obligation of secrecy to the Company or another party.
You hereby agree that the Evaluation Material will be used
solely for the purpose of evaluating a possible transaction between
the Company and you, and that such information will be kept confi-
dential by you and your advisors; provided, however, that (i) any of
such information may be disclosed to your directors, officers and em-
ployees and representatives of your advisors who need to know such
information for the purpose of evaluating any such possible transac-
tion between the Company and you (it being understood that such
directors, officers, employees and representatives shall be informed
by you of the confidential nature of such information and shall be
directed by you to treat such information confidentially), and (ii) any
disclosure of such information may be made to which the Company
consents in writing.
You hereby acknowledge that you are aware, and that you will
advise such directors, officers, employees and representatives who
are informed as to the matters which are the subject of this letter,
that the United States securities laws prohibit any person who has
received from an issuer material, non-public information concerning
the matters which are the subject of this letter from purchasing or
selling securities of such issuer or from communicating such infor-
mation to any other person under circumstances in which it is rea-




In addition, without the prior written consent of the Company,
you will not, and will direct such directors, officers, employees and
representatives not to, disclose to any person either the fact that dis-
cussions or negotiations are taking place concerning a possible trans-
action between the Company and you or any of the terms, conditions
or other facts with respect to any such possible transaction, including
the status thereof.
You hereby acknowledge that the Evaluation Material is being
furnished to you in consideration of your agreement that you will not
propose to the Company or any other person any transaction be-
tween you and the Company and/or its security holders or involving
any of its securities or security holders unless the Company shall
have requested in writing that you make such a proposal, and that
you will not acquire, or assist, advise or encourage any other persons
in acquiring, directly or indirectly, control of the Company or any of
the Company's securities, businesses or assets for a period of three
years from the date of this letter unless the Company shall have con-
sented in advance in writing to such acquisition. You also agree that
the Company shall be entitled to equitable relief, including injunc-
tion, in the event of any breach of the provisions of this paragraph
and that you shall not oppose the granting of such relief.
Although the Company has endeavored to include in the Evalua-
tion Material information known to it which it believes to be relevant
for the purpose of your investigation, you understand that neither
the Company nor any of its representatives or advisors have made or
make any representation or warranty as to the accuracy or complete-
ness of the Evaluation Material. You agree that neither the Company
nor its representatives or advisors shall have any liability to you or
any of your representatives or advisors resulting from the use of the
Evaluation Material.
In the event that you do not proceed with the transaction which
is the subject of this letter within a reasonable time, you shall
promptly redeliver to the Company all written Evaluation Material
and any other written material containing or reflecting any informa-
tion in the Evaluation Material (whether prepared by the Company,
its advisors or otherwise) and will not retain any copies, extracts or
other reproductions in whole or in part of such written material. All
documents, memoranda, notes and other writings whatsoever pre-
pared by you or your advisors based on the information in the Evalu-
ation Material shall be destroyed, and such destruction shall be
certified in writing to the Company by an authorized officer supervis-
ing such destruction.
You agree that unless and until a definitive agreement between
the Company and you with respect to any transaction referred to in
the first paragraph of this letter has been executed and delivered,
1991]
62 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 16
neither the Company nor you will be under any legal obligation of
any kind whatsoever with respect to such a transaction by virtue of
this or any written or oral expression with respect to such a transac-
tion by any of its directors, officers, employees, agents or any other
representatives or its advisors or representatives thereof except, in
the case of this letter, for the matters specifically agreed to herein.
The agreement set forth in this paragraph may be modified or
waived only by a separate writing by the Company and you expressly
so modifying or waiving such agreement.
This letter shall be governed by, and construed in accordance








In connection with the consideration by XYZ (the "Company")
of the possible acquisition of one of the business sectors (the "Busi-
ness") of ABC, you have requested certain information from ABC
concerning the Business as well as ABC and other of its businesses,
which information is either non-public, confidential or proprietary in
nature. All written information heretofore or hereafter furnished or
made available to you and your "representatives" (which term in-
cludes collectively your directors, officers, employees, agents, or
other representatives, including without limitation attorneys, ac-
countants and consultants) by ABC or any of its representatives in
the course of activities related to your consideration of a possible
acquisition of the Business or other transaction with ABC, and all
other analyses, computer files (whether or not reduced to written
form), compilations, memoranda, notes, reports, data, studies or
other documents and all copies and extracts thereof prepared by you
or your representatives containing, or based in whole or in part on
any such information or reflecting your view or evaluation of the
Business or any of its subsidiaries, divisions or other businesses or
assets, is hereinafter referred to as the "Information."
In consideration of your being furnished with the Information,
you agree that:
1. For the period of five years from the date set forth above,
the Information will be kept confidential by you and your representa-
tives and will not, without the prior written consent of ABC, be dis-
closed by you or your representatives, in any manner whatsoever, in
whole or in part, and will not be used by you or your representatives
for any purpose other than assisting you in evaluating a possible ac-
quisition of the Business by you. Moreover, you agree to transmit
the Information only to those representatives who are officers or em-
ployees of you or your subsidiaries and who need to know the Infor-
mation and who agree to be bound by the terms of this Agreement,
and to such other of your representatives or affiliates (as used herein
"affiliates" includes any person or entity directly or indirectly,
through one or more intermediaries, controlling you or controlled
by or under common control with you), as we may in writing approve
prior to disclosure of the Information who need to know the Infor-
mation for the purpose of evaluating or subsequently assisting in a
possible acquisition of the Business by you and who agree to be
bound by the terms of a confidential agreement acceptable to ABC.
You agree to notify ABC, prior to the delivery or disclosure of any
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Information to your third party representatives or affiliates. You will
be responsible for any breach of this Agreement by your representa-
tives or affiliates.
2. Without the prior written consent of ABC, you and your
representative will not disclose to any other person the fact that the
Information has been made available, that discussions or negotia-
tions are taking place concerning a possible acquisition of the Busi-
ness by you, or any of the terms, conditions or other facts with
respect to such a transaction, including the status thereof, except as
is permitted by paragraph 8 of this Agreement. The term "person"
as used in this Agreement will be broadly interpreted to include
without limitation any corporation, company, group, partnership or
individual.
3. You shall keep a record of each location of the Information.
In the event discussions with respect to a possible acquisition of the
Business or other transaction with ABC are terminated, upon ABC's
request the portion of the Information furnished or made available
to you or your representative by ABC or any of its representatives
shall be returned to ABC without your retaining copies thereof and
all other Information will be destroyed without your retaining copies
thereof. Such determination will be confirmed in writing by an of-
ficer of the Company.
4. This Agreement shall be inoperative as to such portions of
the Information which (i) are or become generally available to the
public other than as a result of a disclosure by you or your represent-
atives or affiliates; (ii) become available to you on a non-confidential
basis from a source other than ABC, or one of its representatives
which has represented to you (and which you have no reason to dis-
believe after due inquiry) is entitled to disclose it; or (iii) were known
to you on a non-confidential basis prior to the disclosure to you by
ABC or one of its representatives.
5. The Company acknowledges that it is aware (and that its
representatives who are apprised of this matter have been, or upon
becoming apprised will be, advised) of the restrictions imposed by
the United States federal securities laws and other applicable laws on
a person possessing material non-public information about a com-
pany. The Company hereby agrees that while it is in possession of
the Information, and for a period of five years thereafter, neither it
nor any of its representatives or affiliates will directly or indirectly
propose to ABC on behalf of itself or any third party, or in any man-
ner participate itself or with a third party, or assist any third party, in
(i) a purchase or an offer or an agreement to purchase any securities
or assets of ABC or any subsidiary or affiliate of ABC; (ii) an offer or
an agreement to enter into any acquisition, merger or other business
combination transaction relating to ABC or any subsidiary or other
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affiliates of ABC; (iii) seek any modifications to or waiver of the Com-
pany's agreements and obligation under this Agreement; or (iv)
make any public announcement with respect to the foregoing, unless
any such offer or proposal shall have been specifically invited by the
Chief Executive Officer or the Board of Directors of ABC or unless
any such proposal shall relate to an immaterial amount of assets or
insignificant subsidiary or affiliate of ABC and with respect to which
a representative of ABC has invited a proposal by the Company.
6. While you are in possession of the Information and for one
year thereafter all your representatives in possession of the Informa-
tion or otherwise aware of the discussion or negotiations between us
agree not to solicit or cause or assist in the solicitation of, the em-
ployment of, or employ, any officer or executive or management em-
ployee of ABC who is engaged in whole or in part in the Business or
with whom you have had contact in connection with your evaluation
of the Business.
7. You understand that we have endeavored to include in the
Information those materials which are believed to be responsive to
your request and reliable and relevant for the purpose of our assist-
ing you, but you acknowledge that neither ABC nor any of its repre-
sentatives makes any representation or warranty as to the accuracy or
completeness of the Information. You agree that neither ABC nor
any of its representatives or affiliates shall have any liability to you or
any of your representatives and affiliates, it being understood that
only particular representations and warranties which may be made
by ABC in a definitive agreement in respect of the acquisition of the
Business, when, as and if it is negotiated and executed, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as may be specified in such defini-
tive agreement, shall have any legal effect.
8. In the event that you or anyone to whom we transmit the
Information pursuant to this Agreement are requested or become
legally compelled (by oral questions, interrogatories, request for in-
formation or documents, subpoena, civil investigative demand or
similar process) to disclose any of the Information, you will provide
ABC with prompt written notice so that ABC may seek a protective
order or other appropriate remedy or waive compliance with the
provisions of the agreement. In the event that such protective order
or other remedy is not obtained, and to the extent that ABC has not
waived that portion of the Information which your counsel advises
you are legally required to disclose, you will exercise your best ef-
forts to obtain reliable assurance that confidential treatment will be
accorded such Information.
9. You agree that ABC shall be entitled to equitable relief, in-
cluding injunction and specific performance, in the event of any
breach of the provisions of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, or 8 of this
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Agreement. Such remedies shall not be deemed to be the exclusive
remedies for a breach of the Agreement by you, your representatives
or affiliates but shall be in addition to other remedies available at law
or equity.
10. It is further understood and agreed that no failure or delay
by ABC in exercising any right, power, or privilege under this agree-
ment shall operate as a waiver thereof nor shall any single or partial
exercise thereof preclude any other or further exercise of any right,
power or privilege hereunder. This agreement may be amended or
terminated only by a writing signed by the parties.
11. This agreement shall be governed and construed in ac-
cordance with the laws of the State of - applicable to agreements








The undersigned, ABC, and XYZ, have been discussing for sev-
eral months a proposed joint venture in the field of the Technology
(as hereinafter defined). ABC and XYZ are presently negotiating the
terms and conditions of the proposed joint venture and have not
reached an agreement in principle. However, in order to continue
the negotiations, ABC and XYZ have agreed as follows:
1. Subject to Paragraph 3 hereof, from and after the date
hereof until the close of business on -, unless this Agreement is
earlier terminated by mutual agreement, XYZ will not, directly or
indirectly, (a) solicit, initiate discussions or engage in negotiations
with any person, other than ABC, relating to the possible acquisition
of any Technology (as hereinafter defined) (whether such negotia-
tions are initiated by XYZ or otherwise); (b) provide information to
any person, other than ABC, relating to the possible acquisition of
any Technology (whether by way of merger, purchase of capital
stock, purchase of assets or otherwise); or (c) enter into a transaction
with any person, other than ABC, concerning the possible acquisi-
tion of any Technology (whether by way of merger, purchase of capi-
tal stock, purchase of assets or otherwise).
2. Subject to Paragraph 3 hereof, from and after the date
hereof until the close of business on -, unless this Agreement is
earlier terminated by mutual agreement, XYZ will not, directly or
indirectly, (a) sell, lease, license, transfer, pledge, mortgage, hy-
pothecate or otherwise dispose of any Technology or any material
asset, property or right of or belonging to XYZ relating to the Tech-
nology; (b) enter into any transaction relating to the Technology
outside of the ordinary course of business; or (c) disclose any confi-
dential or proprietary information contained in or relating to the
Technology to any person, other than ABC, its representatives or
agents.
3. Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary:
(a) XYZ and its subsidiaries may discuss licensing arrange-
ments with potential licensees of Technology upon prior notice to
ABC and with ABC's prior consent, which consent will not be unrea-
sonably withheld; provided, however, that each potential licensee shall
sign a confidentiality agreement in form and substance acceptable to
ABC and XYZ, and ABC shall be given an opportunity to participate
in all discussions with such potential licensees;
(b) XYZ and its subsidiaries may license or transfer all or any
portion of the Technology to any wholly-owned direct or indirect
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subsidiary of XYZ; provided, however, that such transferee agrees to
become a party to and be bound by the terms of this Agreement;
(c) XYZ and its subsidiaries may disclose Technology to their
attorneys and other legal representatives and may prosecute patent
applications concerning Technology before the relevant patent of-
fices of any country and obtain patents thereon.
4. The parties hereto recognize and acknowledge that in the
event (i) XYZ shall enter into an agreement or understanding with
any person, other than ABC, concerning the acquisition of any Tech-
nology (whether by way of merger, purchase of assets or otherwise)
prior to the Stipulated Date (as hereinafter defined); or (ii) XYZ shall
breach or otherwise violate Section 1, 2 or 3 of this Agreement prior
to the Stipulated Date and, within 30 days after the Stipulated Date,
enter into an agreement or understanding with such person concern-
ing the acquisition of any Technology (as aforesaid); ABC will suffer
irreparable and material loss and damage, the amount of which is not
readily determinable and, accordingly, the parties agree that in such
event XYZ shall immediately pay to ABC, as liquidated damages (and
not as a penalty), an amount equal to the sum of (A) all reasonable
out-of-pocket expenses incurred by ABC in connection with the ne-
gotiations and due diligence investigation contemplated hereby (in-
cluding, without limitation, all attorneys', accountants' and other
professional fees and expenses) and (B) the amount of
US$2,000,000, and upon such payment, this Agreement shall termi-
nate; provided, however, that such payment shall be ABC's sole and
exclusive remedy for the events specified in Paragraph 4 (i) and (ii)
above; provided further, however, that nothing contained herein shall
limit or otherwise restrict ABC from pursuing any legal or equitable
remedy with respect to any other breach or violation by XYZ of this
Agreement.
If the foregoing accurately sets forth our understanding with re-
spect to the subject matter hereof, kindly execute this letter where
indicated below and return such executed copy to ABC.
Very truly yours,
By: ABC
AGREED TO AND ACCEPTED AS OF
THE DATE FIRST ABOVE WRITTEN
By: XYZ
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